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Continuing rapid growth of China and India can be 
expected to raise incomes in Russia, but also to put 
adjustment pressure on Russian firms. The impacts of 
the rapid growth of China and India on the Russian 
economy are explored by examining a baseline projection 
using a global general equilibrium model, and then 
assessing the implications of higher-than-expected 
growth in China and India. The authors find that a 
major source of benefits to Russia is likely to be terms-
of-trade improvements associated with higher energy 
prices—a quite different channel of effect from that 
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for many developing countries that benefit primarily 
through expanded opportunities to trade directly with 
these emerging giants. Taking into account the likely 
improvements in the quality and variety of exports 
from China and India, the gains to Russia increase 
substantially. The expansion of the energy sector and the 
contraction of manufacturing and services are a sign of a 
Dutch disease effect that will increase the importance of 
policies to encourage adaptation to the changing world 
environment. 
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Implications of the Growth of China and 
India for the Other Asian Giant: Russia 
Introduction 
Wilson and Purushothaman (2003) and many other recent studies have pointed to the rapid 
changes associated with the growth of today’s major developing economies, including Brazil, 
Russia, India and China (the BRICs). Trade linkages, both direct and indirect, are transforming 
world trade, and particularly the trade of countries such as Russia, which has most of its territory 
in Asia and is actively involved in regional trade forums such as APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation). Projected future growth of China and India also appears likely to have major 
impacts through increased demand for the natural resources that are of special importance to 
Russia.  
Changes in trade are arguably the strongest and most direct channel through which the 
growth of China and India has affected other developing countries. China alone accounted for 
7.2 percent of world exports in 2006—substantially more than her share of world GDP at market 
prices (estimated at 6.0 percent in 2007) and more than three times Russia’s share of world 
exports in 2006. China’s openness is high for a large economy, and it reflects partly the fact that 
as much as a third of the value of exports comes from imported inputs (Winters and Yusuf 2007). 
With annual growth at 15.1 percent over the period 1995 to 2004, China has been the second 
largest contributor after the US to world merchandise trade providing almost 9 percent of the 
increase in world exports, and 8 percent of the increase in world imports. While the turbulence 
associated with the current financial crisis seems likely to cause substantial fluctuations, the 
underlying trend rates of growth in the trade of China and India seem likely to remain strong. 
In earlier work, we have examined the implications of the growth of China and India for 
other developing countries, and particularly the East Asian newly industrialized countries. This 
work (see Dimaranan, Ianchovichina and Martin 2007, 2009) highlighted the benefits to other   3
developing countries from increases in their direct trade and the potentially adverse impacts of 
greater competition in third markets. Our work on Europe highlighted the benefits from direct 
trade, and some interesting interactions of changes on energy prices and domestic taxation 
policies for energy (Martin, Ianchovichina and Dimaranan 2008). In this paper, and in related 
work on the Middle East (Ianchovichina, Ivanic and Martin 2008), we pay more attention to 
impacts through changes in the prices of resources resulting from the growth of China and India.  
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the trade implications of the growth of China and 
India for Russia. We begin by considering the nature of the key trade linkages between Russia, 
China and India, and review the available literature on the nature and magnitude of these effects. 
Then, we consider a baseline to 2020 showing the nature of the changes in a world economy 
heavily influenced by the higher growth rates of large developing countries. Finally, we present 
simulation results showing the implications of higher growth in China and India for Russia and 
offer concluding remarks. 
What the Literature Tells Us 
 
If we hold policy settings constant in the world, the trade impacts of growth in China and India 
on Russia can usefully be divided into four channels: (i) opportunities for Russia to export to 
China and India; (ii) opportunities for Russia to import from China and India; (iii) third-market 
export competition from China and India; and (iv) indirect trade impacts. 
The first two of these interactions unambiguously involve gains to countries trading with 
China and India, although the first is typically seen politically, as well as economically, as a gain, 
while the second is frequently seen politically as a loss. The third interaction invariably involves 
a loss to countries competing with China and India in third markets, and it is frequently the 
subject of a great deal of attention and angst. The fourth of these interactions is fundamentally 
ambiguous in sign. If increased imports by China and India raise the prices of goods that are also 
imported (exported) by Russia, then the effect can be adverse (favorable). As an example, Russia 
could expect to gain from increases in the demand for oil in China and India, even if that oil is 
supplied by the Middle East or Africa. Each of these channels of effect is discussed further 
below.   4
Opportunities to export to China and India 
The opportunities to export to China and India are expanding extremely rapidly. China in 
particular has become an important destination for exports of other countries’ primary products. 
In metals and coal, China ranks first, with shares of 15 to 33 percent of world consumption; in 
energy China ranks second or third after the USA (Streifel 2006). India and China are important 
consumers of agricultural commodities with India leading the world in consumption of sugar and 
tea, while China in consumption of wheat, rice, palm oil, cotton and rubber.  Even more striking 
is the rate at which China has increased imports of primary products in recent years. According 
to Streifel (2006), soybean consumption has been growing by around 15 percent a year, and soy 
and palm oil consumption by 20 percent and 25 percent, respectively.  
Since 1995 China has accounted for nearly 40 percent of global growth in imports of 
fuels and minerals. Most of this increase represents a net increase in demand as millions of 
Chinese consumers, and more recently Indian consumers, have grown richer, and increased their 
consumption of resource-intensive goods. As pointed out by Shalizi (2007), changes in the 
energy intensity of growing economies can have a large impact on the demand for energy.  
Opportunities to import from China and India 
The growth of China and India has created enormous opportunities for their trading partners to 
benefit economically from cheaper and higher-quality imports. While this is frequently seen 
purely as a political cost, it is a potentially very important source of economic gains. Amiti and 
Freund (2007) find that the prices of China’s exports to the USA fell by 1.6 percent per year 
between 1997 and 2005. The growth of China’s exports has been accompanied by technological 
upgrading. Devlin, Estevadeordal, and Rodríguez-Clare (2006) show how high-technology goods 
have partly displaced low-technology ones within the set of China’s manufactured exports. This 
upgrading reflects both imports of more sophisticated products and local improvements in 
product quality (Branstetter and Lardy 2006). 
The expansion of China and India’s trade differs from the expansion of developing 
countries’ exports considered in much of the traditional development literature that focused on 
the deterioration in the terms of trade associated with expanding exports of primary 
commodities. China and India’s trade growth involves, for instance, two-way trade in   5
manufactures and services, which make the recipient countries the beneficiaries of improvements 
in efficiency in their trading partners (Martin 1993). It also involves fragmentation and global 
production sharing, where part of the production process is undertaken in one economy, and 
subsequent stages are undertaken in another (Ando and Kimura 2003; Gaulier, Lemoine and 
Unal-Kesenci 2004). This makes participants in this process beneficiaries from, rather than 
victims of, improvements in the competitiveness of their partners. And new trade theory now 
recognizes that export expansion does not involve just increases in exports of the same products. 
Rapidly growing economies expand the range of products they export, improve product quality, 
and export to additional markets as their exports grow (Evenett and Venables 2002; Hummels 
and Klenow 2005). 
In addition, the trade patterns of growing countries tend to be quite dynamic. A large part 
of the growth of exports from a growing economy tends to be from new products (Hummels and 
Klenow, 2005). Further, the quality of the goods exported tends to increase substantially as 
economies grow, increasing the benefit to both the exporting country and its trading partners as 
shown by Dimaranan, Ianchovichina and Martin (2007). Both of these developments generate 
direct benefits to the trading partners of the emerging economies. The benefit in the case of 
improved quality is very clear. Higher quality goods allow importers to meet their needs with a 
smaller quantity of the good, and/or to consume more in response to a lower effective price of 
the good. The benefit from the increase in the number of goods supplied by the emerging market 
generates a benefit to countries that value an increase in the variety of goods available to them—
a phenomenon frequently captured using formulations such as Dixit-Stiglitz preferences (see, for 
example, Hummels and Klenow, 2005).  
Improvements in the quality of exported goods produced by an emerging market supplier 
increase the demand for these goods at any given price level, and hence tend to lead to increases 
in the actual unit prices received for imports from these suppliers. The result is an improvement 
in the terms of trade, and in the real incomes, of both the emerging exporter and the importer. 
How strong this increase is will depend upon the extent of the improvement in quality, on the 
increase in the number of varieties of products exported, and on the extent to which importers 
value increases in the variety of goods imported. If policy settings allow imported inputs to be 
used in partner countries, improvements in the variety and quality of imported inputs can be a   6
particularly important source of dynamism in the manufacturing sector (Amiti and Konings 
2007). 
Third-market competition 
To the extent that the trade interactions between China and India, and other countries involve 
third-market competition, the countries facing increased competition stand to lose. As found by 
Freund and Ozden (2008) and by Hanson and Robertson (2008), some industries in some 
countries can and will lose from increased competition from the two countries. A key question is 
which countries and which industries will face the most serious competition? And where will the 
largest opportunities be found?  
Lederman, Olarreaga and Perry (2008) report that aggregate gains have been 
accompanied by pain as some industries, firms, and sub-regions have been negatively affected by 
the rapid growth of the two Asian economies. Some of their background studies found this to be 
the case, for example, in industrial and electrical machinery, electronics, furniture, textiles, and 
transport equipment, mainly in Mexico and to some extent in Central American countries. Most 
of the deterioration in the position of Latin American exports in third markets relative to China 
and India’s has to do more with domestic supply-side conditions than with lower demand for 
products from Latin America due to increases in China and India’s market shares.  
However, as noted in Dimaranan, Ianchovichina and Martin (2008), the trade impacts of 
fast growing economies today are very different from those that have typically been analyzed 
when considering the impacts of growth in primary-producing developing countries. In the 
traditional literature on the “fallacy of composition,” a rapidly-growing developing country was 
typically a supplier of a raw agricultural or mineral commodity produced by other developing 
countries. Although this literature was subsequently extended to take into account the rapid 
growth in exports of manufactures from developing countries, it continued to focus only on 
third-market export competition from developing countries, in which only negative impacts from 
the growth of other developing countries’ exports are feasible. If, for instance, Vietnam or 
Indonesia should grow by expanding exports of coffee or cocoa (or socks), then the traditional 
exporters of these goods could expect to lose from increased competition in third markets. The 
only research question is how large these effects might be.    7
The answer to this question in the case of Russia depends a great deal on the extent to 
which China and India’s patterns of exports overlap with each other and with Russia’s.  As 
shown in Dimaranan, Ianchovichina and Martin (2007), the export patterns of China and India 
have been quite different, with India relying much more heavily than China on exports of 
services. Even within merchandise trade, their export patterns have been radically different at the 
six-digit level of the Harmonized System, with only one product—refined petroleum—appearing 
on the two countries’ top-25 list of products, which accounted for 58.4 percent of India’s 
merchandise exports and 38.4 percent of China’s in 2004.
1 Neither has an export composition 
anything like that of Russia. This difference in export patterns reduces the risk of a collision in 
which the prices of exports by China, India, Russia and other developing countries are all 
simultaneously depressed. 
Complicating factor in the analysis is the fact that, while both China and India are more 
labor-abundant than developed economies, relative factor endowments and income levels vary 
substantially across regions within China and India. Many of China’s coastal areas are in a 
different income-level category than the much more labor-abundant inland provinces. This 
heterogeneity can influence the range of goods produced and exported by China, and therefore it 
helps explain the disproportionate similarity of China’s export bundle with those of the 
developed countries (Schott, 2007). India’s large number of skilled workers also implies that 
there may be a lot more competition between India and developed economies than suggested by 
its relative endowment shares.  
Although China and India’s merchandise exports are dominated by manufactures (World 
Bank 2003), the composition of these manufactures and the approach to their production differ 
considerably. While their shares of manufactured intermediate inputs in non-fuel imports in 2004 
were very similar, their shares of imports of parts and components differed sharply as might be 
expected given China’s much greater role in global production sharing. In 2004, imports of parts 
                                                            
1 A notable feature of China’s list is the prominence of computer and electronic equipment products under Chapters 
84 and 85. These two chapters, which also include non-electronic equipment, alone accounted for almost 42 percent 
of China’s exports in 2004, up from 16 percent in 1994. In India, three HS products under Chapter 71 (diamonds and 
jewelry) and refined petroleum under Chapter 27 likewise accounted for 28 percent of total exports.  
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and components accounted for 31 percent of China’s merchandise imports, as against only 12 
percent in India.  
On the export side, the two countries also differ substantially in the importance of final 
goods in their exports (Dimaranan, Ianchovichina and Martin 2007). China has relied primarily 
on exports of final manufactured products, frequently as part of an East Asian production sharing 
network. In 2004, 61 percent of China’s non-fuel exports were classified as final goods, 
compared to 40 percent of India’s. Within manufactures, China has relied heavily on exports of 
finished goods, while India has focused much more on exports of intermediate inputs. India’s 
exports are mostly comprised of capital- and skill-intensive goods, while China has emphasized 
exports of labor-intensive goods—although these are increasingly sophisticated (Rodrik 2006).  
India’s share of commercial services in total goods and services exports has been much 
higher than China’s, not just since the rapid expansion of exports of computing services around 
2000, but for the entire period since 1992 during which comparable estimates are available. The 
share of services in India’s exports, at around 20 percent, began over twice as high as China’s. 
This share declined in India until the late 1990s, when it again started to rise sharply. Since 2000, 
services have accounted for over a quarter of India’s exports, while have declined to under 10 
percent of total Chinese exports although China’s exports of services have been growing rapidly 
in absolute terms. However, both countries still have relatively small world shares (1.8 percent 
and 2.8 percent of world services exports, respectively) and services trade alone is unlikely to 
transform India’s economic performance (Winters and Yusuf 2007). 
Finally, China’s export growth has been accompanied by tremendous growth in product 
variety. While China was present in 9 percent of all manufacturing product categories in 1972, it 
was present in 70 percent of categories by 2001 (Schott 2007). This growth at the extensive 
margin is an important factor, which we take into account when evaluating the implications of 
rapid growth in China and India on the rest of the world. 
An important concern for Russia and other countries will be the extent to which the 
giants, especially China, move up market into their “product space.” India and China have 
demonstrated their ability to upgrade their performance in specific sectors. This issue is explored 
by Dimaranan, Ianchovichina and Martin (2007) by examining the potential implications of   9
different types of growth in China and India. They find that adjustment pressures in particular 
sectors are likely to be much greater if growth is driven by biased technical change in high-
growth sectors in China and India than if it is driven by broad-based and relatively neutral 
technical change.  
Indirect trade impacts 
The rapid growth of imports and exports by China and India is likely to change the prices of 
many goods of interest to Russia, even if these goods are not traded directly. The sign of these 
effects is ambiguous, because it depends on the relationship between the mix of these products 
and those exported and imported by Russia. Particular areas where price changes seem likely are 
in agricultural commodities and natural resources, and particularly energy products (see 
Dimaranan, Ianchovichina and Martin, 2007). The relationship between the growth of output in 
emerging countries and the prices of these goods is likely to be different from that of 
manufactures and services. 
For manufactures and services, we would expect a decline in prices relative to factor 
prices (in actual, rather than effective, prices). Productivity growth, or more efficient use of 
factors, in the emerging economies is raising their output, and hence putting downward pressure 
on the prices of manufactures and services. Energy and mineral products are different in that 
their supply is constrained by a fixed factor, energy resources. As incomes rise, the demand for 
energy grows strongly, and this tends to push up the price of energy products relative to factor 
prices. In our experiment, this effect is muted, but not completely offset, by the increase in the 
productivity of energy production itself assumed in the analysis. 
For agricultural goods, there are several competing influences on prices. The first is the 
technological-change effect described above for manufactures and services, which tends to lower 
prices. A second is the presence of a fixed factor, land, in agricultural production, which tends to 
raise prices because world income demand for these goods has risen, just as in the case of energy 
products. A third factor is the well-known Engel effect—that demand for agricultural products, 
and particularly basic foods, tends to rise more slowly than income. A fourth factor that can be 
important in influencing agricultural prices is the Rybczynski effect—if growth is associated   10
with increases in the capital-labor ratio, it will tend to reduce agricultural output and raise 
agricultural prices.  
Dimaranan, Ianchovichina and Martin (2007) find that higher growth in the giants 
implies increases in output of farm and forestry products in other countries and in output of 
energy, mineral and other resource-based products in countries endowed with natural resources. 
As China and India achieve major gains in their market shares in manufacturing, most other 
countries experience declines in manufacturing output relative to base, especially in clothing and 
electronics, which are sensitive to increased competition from the labor-intensive giants. 
Therefore, even if the two countries' success is generally good news for other economies, there 
are adjustment costs that will be borne by different stakeholders within those countries. 
Methodology and Simulation Design 
 
We use a modified version of the standard GTAP model (Hertel 1997) to analyze the 
consequences of higher growth in China and India on Russia. The model includes the explicit 
treatment of international trade and transport margins, a “global” bank designed to mediate 
between world savings and investment, and a relatively sophisticated consumer demand system 
designed to capture differential price and income responsiveness across countries. Product 
differentiation between imported and domestic goods and among imports from different regions 
allow for two-way trade in each product category, depending on the ease of substitution between 
products from different regions.
2 Factor inputs of land, capital, skilled and unskilled labor, and in 
some sectors a natural resource factor, are also included in the model, which emphasizes the 
constraints imposed on economies by their overall resource endowments, and takes into account 
the role of intersectoral factor mobility and overall resource constraints in determining sectoral 
output supply.  
We modified the constant returns to scale version of the GTAP model to incorporate 
China’s duty exemptions—which have been a key reason for the rapid integration of China into 
                                                            
2 Imported and domestic intermediates are imperfect substitutes following the Armington structure.   11
global production networks—and to allow for much deeper integration by India into global 
production sharing than has been the case in the past.
3 Duty exemptions were incorporated in the 
GTAP model and data base following the methodology developed by Ianchovichina (2004). This 
duty exemption model allows for two separate activities in each industry – production of exports 
and production for the domestic market. Production of exports is represented as an activity for 
which imported intermediate inputs are available duty-free. Production for the domestic market 
uses the same technology as the production for exports, but requires payment of duties on 
intermediate inputs. Ianchovichina (2004) shows that failure to account for duty exemptions will 
introduce bias in trade liberalization outcomes in countries using such export processing systems. 
The 57 sectors of the GTAP 7 (pre-release 4) database were aggregated into 26 sectors 
based on their importance in China, India and Russia. Because the 106 regions in this database 
would provide too much unnecessary detail and slow down our calculations, we aggregated most 
regions into 11 regional aggregate groups and 14 separate countries of interest—including 
Russia, China, India and a number of countries in the Asian region. 
To examine the implications of more rapid growth in China and India on Russia, we 
needed first to take account of some of the major reforms that are transforming India’s trade 
structure, in particular liberalization of non-agricultural tariffs, the introduction of free-trade 
zones where imported intermediate inputs used in the production of exports are exempt from 
import tariffs, and improvements in infrastructure needed to support trade. Then, to provide a 
benchmark against which the effects of higher growth rates of output might be assessed, we 
undertake a baseline projection to 2020 (See Table 1). This baseline allows us to take account of 
the much higher expected rates of growth in many developing countries, including China and 
India, than in the mature industrial economies, and a consequent greater impact of future changes 
in outcomes in developing countries. 
We examine the implications of higher-than-projected growth in India and China in order 
to assess the direct implications of growth in China and India on Russia. We assumed that 
growth rates in China and India were 2 percentage points per year higher than under the baseline. 
                                                            
3 This was done assuming large-scale liberalization of the non-agricultural sector in India and the introduction of an 
effective system of duty exemptions for inputs used in the production of exports in India.   12
For comparability with Dimaranan, Ianchovichina and Martin (2007), we considered accelerated 
growth over a fifteen year baseline which resulted in output levels 34.6 percent higher in each 
region than under the baseline scenario. Consistent with Kaldor’s (1957) stylized facts of 
economic growth, we also increased the stock of human and physical capital in line with the 
overall output increase in these two growing economies.  
Recent empirical evidence (see, in particular Hummels and Klenow , 2005) suggests that 
economic growth of the type considered increases both the quality and the variety of the goods 
exported by the growing economy. Building on Hummels and Klenow (2005), the quality of 
goods exported is represented using a variable, λ, which determines the number of effective units 
of a good obtained from each actual, physical unit of that good. It has a counterpart in the 
popular iceberg specification for international transport costs, but is much more general in 
allowing the additional units of effective output to arise from a wider range of sources than 
changes in transport costs. Where purchasers have utility or demand functions that value gains in 
variety, the effective prices of goods decline as the variety of goods supplied increases.  
The macroeconomic closure of the simulation model assumes a constant level of 
employment, perfect mobility of skilled and unskilled labor between sectors but none between 
regions. Because we look at long-run trends, we have doubled the elasticity of substitution 
between imported goods from different sources and between composite imported and domestic 
goods from the values used in the given GTAP database. In all simulations the trade balances as 
shares of GDP were fixed for China and India to avoid potentially important changes in welfare 
resulting from changes in financial inflows from abroad when growth rates in these countries 
change substantially. 
Results 
Impact of global growth 2005-2020 
According to the widely-used projections for the growth in GDP, labor force, capital and 
population presented in Table 1, the most rapidly growing regions are expected to be the 
countries of South East Asia—China, Malaysia, India, Vietnam and Indonesia—all growing   13
above 5 percent per year in the period between 2005 and 2020. These projections involve a lower 
growth rate for Russia over the entire period of 3.1 percent per year. 
Tables 2 and 3 show some key effects of global growth in the 2005-2020 baseline period 
for the world and for Russia, respectively. The first two sets of columns in the two tables show 
industries’ base output shares and growth rates in the world and Russia. The numbers suggest 
that for most products the expansion in Russia is more modest than that in the world markets 
except for energy, vehicles, communication and other services.  When we take into account the 
shares of output, we may also calculate the contribution of each sector’s growth to the total 
growth. Most of world growth, about 33 percent, is attributed to growth in services other than 
trade, transportation and communication services, followed by trade and transportation services 
(16 percent), and communication services (13 percent). In Russia, services other than trade, 
transportation and communication services are even more important, contributing 41 percent to 
aggregate growth, followed by trade and transportation sector (14 percent) and energy (12 
percent). The fact that energy contributes much larger share to aggregate growth in Russia than 
in the world economy (just 2 percent) underscores the importance of developments affecting this 
sector for Russia’s growth outlook. 
The differences between Russia and the global economy become even more striking 
when we compare their patterns of exports. While half of world export growth can be attributed 
to four sectors including machinery (15 percent) and electronics (15 percent), vehicles (10 
percent) and chemicals (11 percent), most of Russia’s export growth (70 percent) is accounted 
for by energy exports (52 percent) and metals (17 percent). This result highlights the much lower 
degree of export diversification in Russia compared to the rest of the world.  
We also look at the last columns of Tables 2 and 3 showing the changes in export prices 
for the world as a whole and for Russia. The patterns for the two are very similar. Energy prices 
experience the greatest increase as the supply of energy products is constrained by a fixed factor, 
energy resources, although energy output can be augmented by applying additional capital and 
labor. As incomes rise, the demand for energy grows strongly, and this tends to push up the price 
of energy products relative to factor prices. In our experiment, this effect is muted, but not 
completely offset, by the increase in the productivity of energy production itself assumed in the 
analysis.    14
For manufactures and services, we would expect a decline in prices relative to the 
composite price of factors
4 (in actual, rather than effective, prices). World output has increased 
for any given level of factor use, and the price of the augmented factors used in production of 
manufactures has risen relative to the price of commodities. 
For agricultural products the results are mixed, with prices of some products in world 
markets—namely wheat, vegetables and fruits, plant-based fibers and other crops—rising 
slightly, while prices of other agricultural product decline to varying degrees. These results 
quantify the importance of different factors influencing prices in the long run for Russia and the 
world economy. These include technical change, the presence of an important fixed factor (land), 
and the Engel and Rybczynski effects discussed in the previous section.  
 
Impacts of additional growth of China and India 
While the results from the baseline scenario are interesting, they do not allow us to tell how 
much of the changes observed in the baseline are due to the extraordinary performance of the 
Chinese and Indian economies. To gain some insight into this, we consider the impact of 
additional growth of 2 percentage points per year in China and India. The higher growth 
performance might be thought of as resulting from higher-than-projected performance beyond 
the baseline outcome and, hence, allowing us to assess the implications of higher growth. 
Alternatively, given the near-linearity of the model for this type of experiments, it might—with a 
change of sign—give an indication of how much the outcomes in the baseline would have fallen 
short of the observed levels had growth rates in China and India been 2 percent per year below 
their baseline levels. The impact of additional growth supplemented with an improvement in the 
quality and variety of exports—under two assumptions about the elasticity of substitution 
between varieties
5—is also examined. 
                                                            
4 This is the numeraire in the model. 
5 We examine two different values (2.5 and 7.5) for the substitution parameter σ in the Hummels-Klenow 
relationship between different product varieties.   15
Welfare impacts 
Table 4(a) summarizes these results for three key economic variables: growth, welfare, and the 
terms of trade. The first two columns of the table show that most countries, including Russia, 
benefit from additional growth of China and India, and all countries and regions considered gain 
if growth is accompanied by improved quality and variety of the growing countries' exports. The 
welfare changes are largest for China and India, which benefit directly from their own growth. 
The gains for other countries are relatively small in the absence of quality and variety 
improvements in exports from China and India (Dimaranan, Ianchovichina and Martin 2009). 
High-income countries gain, except for the EU and Japan, which lose despite terms-of-trade 
gains in the growth-only scenario because of the second-best interactions between existing 
distortions and the price changes resulting from the growth of China and India (Martin, 
Ianchovichina and Dimaranan 2008). 
The reason for the frequently substantial terms-of-trade gains can be inferred from Table 
4(b) that lists the impact of our scenarios on each region’s exports and imports. Many countries 
benefit from improved terms of trade for their products as China increases its imports from the 
rest of the world by 28 percent and India by 33 percent in the growth scenario. This expanded 
demand raises world prices of a number of commodities, while the sharp increases in exports 
from China and India push down their export prices, and lower the cost of other countries’ 
imports.  
In the absence of improvements in the quality and variety of exports from China and 
India, some middle and low income countries such as Thailand, the Philippines, and other 
countries in South Asia, are projected to lose as competition from China and India in third 
markets adversely affects their terms of trade. Improvements in quality and variety of exports 
from China and India have large, favorable impacts on welfare in economies such as Japan, 
Korea, and Hong Kong/Taiwan that trade very extensively with China and India, and less in 
countries like the Philippines that have weaker direct trade links, and are more exposed to 
competition in third markets. 
The welfare gains to Russia from growth in China and India are estimated at $US 8.4 
billion per year. These gains are not associated with increases in export volumes, but arise   16
primarily from terms-of-trade gains of $US 8.7 billion. Further analysis shows that most of these 
gains, about $US 7.3 billion, come from the rising world price of energy—Russia’s main export 
commodity (Table 8). While the welfare benefits of improvements in product quality and variety 
from China and India are substantial, the size of this gain is small relative to those for economies 
such as Malaysia, and Korea, which have much more direct trade in manufactures than does 
Russia. Given its terms-of-trade gains from expansion of China and India, Russia is able to 
increase its consumption at any given volume of exports, which in turn raises domestic prices 
and reduces its ability to export.  
Industry impacts 
Losses in terms of export volumes for Russia suggest that the effect from increased opportunities 
to export to emerging Asia is dominated by the effects from increases in third-market export 
competition and the increase in domestic demand resulting from the terms-of-trade improvement.  
Russia is likely to play a smaller role in exporting manufactured goods with the exception 
of some natural-resource-based manufactures (e.g. paper and wood products, minerals; see Table 
5). The boost to China and India’s manufacturing industries has positive spillover effects via 
increased demand for intermediate inputs including energy and farm products. Within 
manufacturing, the hardest hit sectors are electronics, metals and machinery and equipment 
which contract by 13 percent, 9 percent, and 9 percent, respectively. Electronics and machinery 
are sectors that see the largest declines in prices as they face intensive international competition.   
Tables 5, 6 and 7 explore the impacts of high growth in China and India on Russia’s 
industries under different scenarios. In value terms (see Table 7) the greatest negative impact is 
borne by the metals sector which contracts by $US 7.1 billion, at 2004 prices. This contraction is 
mainly due to the reduction in output volume of 9.3 percent (Table 5), with a small reduction in 
price (0.5 percent) (Table 6). Since this reduction in price is smaller than the worldwide 
reduction, buyers of Russian metals—e.g. the European Union, rest of the Former Soviet Union, 
the USA, and other countries in the rest of the world— have an incentive to switch to other 
suppliers, resulting in a sizable drop in the volume of exports and output of Russia’s metals 
sector.   17
The energy sector gains the most from the extra growth in China and India. The resulting 
increases in the value of output and exports are estimated at $US 19.3 billion and US$ 11 billion, 
respectively (Table 7). Most of the gain can be ascribed to the 6.1 percent rise in the price of 
energy (Table 6) rather than the quantity increase for output (1.7 percent) and exports (4.6 
percent). The processed food sector also shows a significant gain in production of US$ 1.4 
billion (Table 7). This happens despite the reduction in output price by 0.4 percent because of a 
three percent increase in output. Fruit and vegetables production grows by $US 1.2 billion due to 
a production increase of 2.8 percent and a price increase of 1.4 percent.  
The reduction of exports from Russia contrasts strongly with the sharp expansion in 
exports from economies such as Japan and Hong Kong/Taiwan. In these cases, the expansion in 
direct trade with China outweighs the trade-reducing impacts of higher income and the resulting 
Dutch-disease impact of higher prices of nontraded goods.  
Role of China 
Throughout Tables 5, 6 and 8, we report separately the impact of China’s growth alone. We do 
this by decomposing the results of our scenario for each exogenous variable, allowing us to see 
how important China and India are for the welfare outcome and sectoral production in Russia. 
The tables make it clear that in the case of Russia, most of these growth impacts come from 
China’s growth. The impact of China alone accounts for more than US$ 5.0 billion (about 70 
percent) of the total gain to Russia of $US 8.4 billion. Despite the overall significance of China 
over India in impacting the Russian economy, there are a number of—mostly agricultural—
sectors where the impact of India’s growth is greater than that of China’s.  
Conclusions 
 
The key issue for our analysis is the extent to and channels through which higher-than-expected 
rates of growth in China and India affect Russia. In our survey of the literature, we noted that 
there are four broad channels through which the growth of China and India might be expected to 
impact on Russia: (i) opportunities for Russia to export to China and India; (ii) opportunities for   18
Russia to import from China and India; (iii) third-market export competition, and (iv) indirect 
trade impacts. 
In this study, we began with a representation of the world in 2005. We then projected 
forward to 2020, to take into account the rapidly-increasing importance of China and India in the 
world economy. We also took into account liberalization and reductions in trading costs that 
increased India’s interaction with the world economy. For our analysis, we used a special version 
of the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) model designed to allow for extensive export-
oriented manufacturing where Chinese and Indian exporters have access to imported 
intermediate inputs duty-free. In addition to examining the consequences of high export growth 
from China and India, we considered two scenarios under which the quality and variety of 
exports from these two giants improve as they grow. 
Russia benefits substantially from high growth in China and India. Real incomes in 
Russia rise by $US 8.4 billion at 2004 prices when growth alone is considered. When we took 
into account increases in product variety and improvements in quality of exports from India and 
China these gains increased substantially. Because of uncertainty about the closeness of 
substitution between varieties, we considered two possible levels of preference for variety in the 
expansion of exports from China and India. The gains to Russia were $US 14.7 billion in the 
strong preference-for-variety scenario and $US 10.3 billion in the central scenario using the 
elasticity estimates preferred by Hummels and Klenow (2005).  
We found that this increase in growth rates of China and India increases their exports to 
and imports from Russia. The overwhelming majority of the welfare gains—between $US 8.7 
billion and $US 12.6 billion—accrued through improvements in Russia’s terms of trade. These 
terms-of-trade gains were primarily associated with increases in world prices of energy products. 
The increment to growth that we considered raised Russia’s energy export prices between 1.7 
and 6.1 percent, while export prices for manufactured goods and services declined up to 5.8 
percent. The prices of most agricultural prices changed somewhere between -2.8 to 1.8 percent, 
with downward pressure on these prices coming from increased productivity growth in China 
and India, and from the low income elasticities of demand for these products, and upward 
pressure coming from labor being pulled by Rybcznski effects out of agriculture in China and 
India into more capital and skill-intensive activities.    19
Overall, exports from Russia decreased slightly in volume terms (-0.3 percent) in the 
pure-growth scenario, but increased when quality changes in exports from China and India were 
taken into account. Exports of energy, some agricultural products and a few manufactured 
products increased, while exports of apparel, electronics, machinery and equipment, metals, 
automobiles and some services declined. These effects were the result of increased competition 
in third markets and increased domestic demand resulting from the income effects of the terms-
of-trade improvements associated with the growth of China and India.  
The results of this study suggest that the implications of higher growth in China and India 
on Russia are likely to be quite complex. The improvements in the country’s terms-of-trade 
provide worthwhile income gains. These gains are larger when likely improvements in the 
quality and variety of exports from China and India are factored in. Against that, increased 
competition in third markets reduces the opportunities of some Russian sectors to expand exports 
of manufactures, and places some manufactures and services under increased competitive 
pressure in domestic markets. Finally, the expansion of the energy sector and the contraction of 
many manufacturing and service sectors is a sign of a Dutch-disease effect. Russia will face 
increasing pressures to adjust her industries to the changing world environment, and domestic 
and trade policies to improve competitiveness and to promote adjustment to these changes are 
likely to be particularly important.   20
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Table 1 Annual Output, Factor Inputs, and Population Growth Projections, 2005-2020, % 







Australia  &  New  Zealand  3.4 1.6 0.6 3.8 0.7 
China  6.6 0.8 3.9 8.5 0.6 
Japan  1.6 0.2 -0.7 2.5 -0.2 
Korea  4.7 2.0 5.8 4.9 0.3 
Hong  Kong  &  Taiwan  4.3 0.6 2.9 4.9 0.3 
Indonesia  5.2 2.7 6.5 4.7 1.1 
Malaysia  5.6 -1.4 3.9 5.8 1.4 
Philippine  3.5 1.8 4.5 3.4 1.5 
Singapore  4.9 0.6 1.1 5.3 0.8 
Thailand  4.6 0.1 3.2 3.9 0.5 
Vietnam  5.4 1.4 1.9 6.0 1.1 
Rest of Southeast Asia  3.1  1.3  4.2  3.7  1.0 
India  5.5 1.6 4.0 6.1 1.1 
Rest  of  South  Asia  5.0 2.1 3.6 5.1 1.7 
Canada  2.6 1.6 0.9 3.2 0.4 
USA  3.2 1.5 0.8 3.9 0.7 
Mexico  3.8 2.7 4.6 3.3 1.4 
Argentina  &  Brazil  3.6 0.9 3.6 3.1 1.0 
Rest  of  Latin  America  3.3 1.6 3.9 3.4 1.4 
EU  +  EFTA  2.3 0.4 0.1 2.6 0.0 
Russia  3.1 -0.1 0.4 3.4 -0.6 
Former  Soviet  Union  3.4 0.6 1.1 4.4 0.3 
MENA  4.0 1.8 3.0 4.1 1.6 
Sub-Saharan  Africa  3.5 2.6 3.3 3.1 1.9 
Rest  of  World  4.1 0.8 2.5 3.0 0.8 
 Source: World Bank and Center for Global Trade Analysis (GTAP).   23
Table 2 Changes in Key Economic Indicators of the World Economy as a Result of Global Growth, 2005-2020 
   Share of 
output 










Rice  0.3 58.7 0.3  0.1 54.8 0.1 -1.1 
Wheat  0.2 60.4 0.2  0.2 75.8 0.2  1.5 
Grains  0.2 52.7 0.2  0.2 54.9 0.2 -0.4 
Vegetables  &  fruits  0.7 38.3 0.4  0.8 38.8 0.5  2.2 
Oils  and  fats  0.4 81.8 0.5  0.8 77.4 1.0 -11.3 
Sugar  0.2 50.5 0.2  0.1 68.6 0.1 -11.4 
Plant-based  fibers  0.1 84.9 0.1  0.1 108 0.2  4.8 
Other  Crops  0.3 41.8 0.2  0.4 45.3 0.3  0.6 
Livestock  &  meat  1.6 50.1 1.3  1  85.3 1.3 -10.3 
Dairy  0.8 38.9 0.5  0.5 59.1 0.5 -12.9 
Other processed food  3.1  44  2.2  3.1  40.9  2.0  -13.4 
Energy  1.8 61.5 1.8  4.4 81.8 5.6 27.4 
Textiles  1.1 63.9 1.2  2.8 55.2 2.4 -14.1 
Apparel  0.8 62.4 0.8  2.1 48.7 1.6 -15.5 
Leather  0.3 55.3 0.3  1  43.7 0.7 -13.9 
Wood  products  3.2  56  3.0  4.1 53.8 3.5 -15.1 
Minerals  1.6 69.1 1.8  2.3 71.8 2.6 -14.4 
Chemicals  4.8 52.5 4.2 12.3  55.8  10.7  -13.9 
Metals  4.1 63.3 4.3  7.2 64.1 7.2  -15 
Vehicles  3.9 52.8 3.4 11.5  55.8  10.0 -15 
Machinery  &  equipment  4.4 62.8 4.6 14.1  67.8  15.0  -15.3 
Electronics  3.1 88.7 4.5  11 84.7  14.6  -17.8 
Other  manufactures  1  85.8 1.4  1.8 72.1 2.0 -18.3 
Trade  &  Transport  16 61.6  16.2 6.7 66.7 7.0 -15.3 
Communication  services  13.3  60.2  13.2 7.1 60.6 6.7  -18 
Other  services  32.7  61.5  33.1 4.1 63.4 4.1 -16.2 
Total  100 58.8 100 100 64.4 100 -13.3 
Source: Authors’ simulation with modified GTAP model (Ianchovichina, 2004).   24
Table 3. Changes in Key Economic Indicators of Russia as a Result of Global Growth, 2005-2020 












Rice 0  52.7  0.0  0  208  0.0  -10.2 
Wheat  0.7  46  0.6  0.4 96.5 0.8 -0.2 
Grains  0.4 42.9 0.3  0.1 55.3 0.1 -0.2 
Vegetables & fruits  2  37  1.3  0.1  346.5  0.8  -1.1 
Oils  and  fats  0.3 33.5 0.2  0.3 22.3 0.1 -9.7 
Sugar  0.6 50.8 0.5  0 100.2  0.0 -13.4 
Plant-based fibers  0  55.3  0.0  0  145  0.0  1.3 
Other  Crops  0.2 41.5 0.1  0 110.8  0.0 -0.9 
Livestock  &  meat  3.2 45.6 2.6  0.2  75  0.3 -8.9 
Dairy  1.7 46.8 1.4  0.1 45.3 0.1 -10.1 
Other processed food  3.9  52.5  3.6  2.9  82  5.2  -13.1 
Energy  11 64.2  12.4 32  75 52.1  26.4 
Textiles  0.5  44  0.4  0.6 22.7 0.3 -12.8 
Apparel  0.3 41 0.2 0.3 3.7 0.0  -13.4 
Leather  0.4 51.1 0.4  0.2 32.4 0.1 -13.2 
Wood  products  2.2 40.5 1.6  6.2 30.5 4.1 -12.6 
Minerals  2.9 59.2 3.0  2.7  70  4.1 -14.3 
Chemicals  3.2  20  1.1 10.9 2.2  0.5  -10 
Metals  5.6  38  3.7  24.1 32.1 16.8 -13.6 
Vehicles  4.1 53.7 3.9  3.1 35.9 2.4 -13.3 
Machinery  &  equipment  1.2 33.6 0.7  3.4 21.6 1.6 -13.1 
Electronics  0.1 13.2 0.0  0.3 -9.7 -0.1  -13.9 
Other  manufactures  1.3 44.6 1.0  1  0.2  0.0 -14.9 
Trade  &  Transport  14.1  54.4  13.5 4.5 37.4 3.7 -11.7 
Communication  services  5.3 67.3 6.3  3.2 86.6 6.0 -19.6 
Other  services  34.6  67.7  41.2 3.2 11.7 0.8 -12.3 
Total  100 57.3 100 100 47.4 100  0.8 
Source: Authors’ simulations with modified GTAP model (Ianchovichina, 2004). 
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Table 4(a) Impact of China and India’s extra growth 
   Welfare  Terms of trade 
   Growth    G&Q* (σ=2.5) G&Q  (σ=7.5) Growth  G&Q  (σ=2.5) G&Q  (σ=7.5) 
   USD mil  Percent  USD mil  Percent  USD mil  Percent  USD mil USD mil USD mil
Australia & New Zealand  5,280  0.5  19,009  1.8  8,587  0.8  5,136  16,545  7,833 
China  1,042,537 28.9 1,364,962 37.9 1,120,554 31.1  -57,325  273,588  21,516 
Japan  -380  0.0 36,591 0.7  7,491  0.1 2,488  24,305  6,667 
Korea  4,060  0.4 34,571 3.0 10,774 0.9  -573  19,563  3,722 
Hong Kong & Taiwan  2,642  0.4  33,562  4.6  9,429  1.3  2,753  32,573  9,198 
Indonesia  1,247 0.3 5,388 1.2 2,132 0.5 1,091  3,590  1,586 
Malaysia  2,639  1.2 14,148 6.5  5,088  2.3 1,896  7,747  3,033 
Philippine -512  -0.4  1,754  1.4  -197  -0.2  -482  1,140  -265 
Singapore  -344  -0.2 9,970 5.6 1,683 0.9  395  9,695  2,197 
Thailand  356  0.1 8,334 1.6 1,935 0.4  -52  5,590  951 
Vietnam  616  0.8 2,887 3.7 1,032 1.3  619  3,189  1,146 
Rest  of  Southeast  Asia  456  1.9 884 3.7 580 2.5 446  858  565 
India  382,380  30.5 470,535 37.5 403,628 32.2 -14,505  83,857  6,774 
Rest of South Asia  -855  -0.3  3,000  1.0  -114  0.0  -634  3,981  321 
Canada  3,451  0.3 10,927 0.9  5,126  0.4 3,662  8,177  4,636 
USA  15,665  0.1 139,604 0.9  45,020  0.3  4,769  83,542  21,125 
Mexico  2,449  0.2 19,041 1.9  6,154  0.6  217  2,799  634 
Argentina & Brazil  1,915  0.2  10,220  0.9  3,697  0.3  2,007  7,074  3,023 
Rest of Latin America  3,768  0.5  11,359  1.5  5,531  0.7  3,502  8,513  4,648 
EU + EFTA  -4,246  0.0  99,519  0.6 15,699 0.1 6,071  84,808  20,464 
Russia  8,401  1.0 14,661 1.8 10,338 1.3 8,716  12,567  10,059 
Former  Soviet  Union  677  0.3 6,132 2.5 1,891 0.8  222  3,581  925 
MENA  24,920  1.4 43,326 2.4 30,369 1.7 24,530 43,775  30,134 
Sub-Saharan  Africa  6,308  0.8 18,766 2.4  9,389  1.2 5,162  16,767  7,919 
Rest of World  -1,501  -0.2  3,678  0.4  -758  -0.1  -756  7,951  901 
 Source: Authors’ simulations with the modified GTAP model (Ianchovichina, 2004).*G&Q denotes growth accompanied by improvements in export quality.   26
Table 4(b) Impact of China and India’s extra growth on trade  
  Exports Imports 
 Growth  G&Q*  (σ=2.5) G&Q  (σ=7.5) Growth  G&Q  (σ=2.5) G&Q  (σ=7.5) 
 Percent  Percent  Percent  Percent  Percent  Percent 
Australia & New Zealand  1.1  6.7  2.5  4.1  8.5  5.4 
China 33.4  139.8  60.1  28.4  183.9  65.0 
Japan 3.1  13.3  5.4  7.6  21.1  10.7 
Korea 3.3  13.2  5.5  3.8  12.5  5.9 
Hong Kong & Taiwan  1.2  7.9  2.9  2.2  5.4  3.0 
Indonesia -0.1  2.4  0.2  0.4  -2.0  -0.4 
Malaysia -0.9  0.1  -0.7  -0.2  -2.4  -0.8 
Philippine 0.3  4.2  0.7  -0.4  -1.4  -1.3 
Singapore 1.5  10.1  2.7  2.0  7.0  2.4 
Thailand 0.9  6.2  2.0  0.8  1.9  0.9 
Vietnam -0.6  -1.4  -1.0  0.0  -5.1  -1.5 
Rest of Southeast Asia  -1.2  -1.5  -1.4  2.6  -1.8  1.5 
India 40.2  148.0  67.3  34.0  178.7  67.6 
Rest of South Asia  0.9  4.8  1.8  -0.3  -3.6  -1.2 
Canada -0.7  -1.7  -1.0  0.4  -2.1  -0.1 
USA 1.1  9.0  2.8  2.1  4.1  2.6 
Mexico 1.3  8.7  3.1  0.2  -1.8  -0.3 
Argentina & Brazil  0.8  4.0  1.4  2.6  4.1  2.9 
Rest of Latin America  -0.2  2.3  0.3  1.5  1.4  1.5 
EU + EFTA  0.2  0.5  0.2  0.7  -0.5  0.4 
Russia -0.3  3.0  0.4  2.8  3.0  2.9 
Former Soviet Union  0.6  0.8  0.7  -0.2  -1.6  -0.5 
MENA -1.9  0.0  -1.6  2.2  0.1  1.8 
Sub-Saharan Africa  -0.1  3.1  0.6  2.3  2.6  2.5 
Rest of World  1.0  1.8  1.1  0.2  -2.2  -0.4 
 Source: Authors’ simulations with modified GTAP model (Ianchovichina, 2004). *G&Q denotes growth accompanied by improvements in export quality.   27
  
Table 5 Impact of China and India’s extra growth on Russia (change in quantities in percent) 
   Output  Exports  Imports 
















































































































Rice  1.9  1.5  1.4  1.0  1.7  1.4  13.7  6.8  36.7  30.0  16.2  10.2  -2.1 -2.1 -0.5  -0.1  -1.6 -1.6 
Wheat  1.5  1.1  2.1  1.1  1.7  1.1  8.9  6.2  13.5  5.4  10.1 6.3  3.3 3.2 6.3  6.6  4.0 4.0 
Grains  0.5  0.3  0.3  0.2  0.4  0.3 2.5 1.4 4.0 1.0 2.8 1.4 1.3  1.4  2.3 3.0 1.6  1.8 
Vegetables & fruits  2.8  2.6  6.1  5.7  3.6  3.3  112.6  109.8  267.7  259.3  148.2  143.9  3.7  3.7  8.0  8.7  4.7  4.9 
Oils  and  fats  0.0  -0.4  -1.4  -2.0  -0.3  -0.7 -1.2 -2.4 -5.2  -8.4 -2.2 -3.9 2.4 2.2 5.3  5.2  3.1 2.9 
Sugar  1.3  1.0  2.4  2.0  1.6  1.3 2.0 1.5 2.5 0.9 2.0 1.3 1.3  1.2  3.1 3.5 1.7  1.8 
Plant-based  fibers  2.5  1.4  1.3  -0.2  2.3  1.2  15.8  9.7  18.7  10.1  17.0  10.0  -1.0 -0.7 -5.7  -5.0  -2.3 -1.8 
Other  Crops  0.6  0.1  0.5  -0.8  0.6  -0.1 21.8 18.1 41.3 29.0 26.5 21.0 1.1 1.4 1.7  3.2  1.3 1.8 
Livestock  &  meat  0.8  0.6  0.9  0.6  0.9  0.6  23.0 21.0 63.4 55.8 32.8 29.6 2.5 2.1 5.9  5.6  3.4 3.0 
Dairy  0.2  0.1  -0.1  -0.1  0.1  0.1  -4.4 -3.5 -6.5  -6.1 -5.3 -4.3 5.5 4.5 10.6  9.2  6.9 5.7 
Other processed food  3.0  3.0  7.9  8.1  4.2  4.2  19.7  20.1  56.2  58.4  28.4  28.9  2.3  1.9  4.7  4.6  3.0  2.6 
Energy  1.7  1.2  1.3  0.8  1.7  1.2 4.6 3.2 3.7 2.1 4.7 3.2 7.0  4.9  5.4 3.2 7.0  4.8 
Textiles -1.5  -1.5  -14.1  -14.0  -4.7  -4.6 -2.7 -3.1 -32.1  -32.3  -10.6  -10.8 0.8 0.5 -6.2  -6.6 -0.8  -1.1 
Apparel  -2.9  -2.9  -17.0 -16.9  -7.1  -7.0 -6.9 -6.9 -38.1 -36.6  -16.1  -15.3 2.2 1.8  -11.7  -12.4  -1.7  -2.0 
Leather  0.3  0.2  -22.3 -22.5  -4.6  -4.5 -0.1 0.6 -36.3 -34.1  -11.0  -9.4 1.7 1.2 19.8 19.3 5.7 5.0 
Wood  products  0.8  1.1  21.3  20.3  5.2  5.2  4.5  4.8  62.8 59.2 17.2 16.4 2.5 2.0 8.5  7.6  4.0 3.3 
Minerals  -1.5 -1.0 -2.6  -1.7  -1.8 -1.2 2.7 2.8 7.7 10.4 3.9 4.7 0.2  0.2 1.0  0.7 0.4  0.3 
Chemicals  -7.0  -5.0  -10.0  -4.7  -7.9  -5.1 -9.7 -6.6 -3.5  4.9  -8.7 -4.4 3.4 2.5 5.5  4.6  4.1 3.1 
Metals  -9.3 -7.2 -16.1 -14.0 -11.2 -9.1  -12.7  -10.0  -19.1  -17.9  -14.7  -12.3  2.2  1.0 5.0  1.6 2.9  1.1 
Vehicles  -1.0  -0.8  -1.7  -1.2  -1.1  -0.8 -4.5 -3.5  1.5  2.7  -3.2 -2.1 2.6 2.1 6.4  5.2  3.5 2.7 
Machinery  &  equipment  -8.8  -7.5  -24.9  -24.9  -12.3  -11.4 -13.4 -12.2 -33.4 -39.0 -17.8 -18.3  1.0  0.8  -2.1  -2.5  0.4  0.2 
Electronics  -12.7 -11.9  -52.5  -51.8  -23.5  -22.6 -16.3 -16.0 -48.4 -50.4 -26.2 -27.0  1.0  0.8  -9.2  -9.5  -1.2 -1.4 
Other  manufactures  -4.7  -4.1  -14.8  -13.7  -7.2  -6.4  -22.8 -17.9 -54.1  -44.3 -33.0 -25.9 15.0 14.0 33.8  32.0  19.6 18.3 
Trade  &  Transport  -0.4 -0.3  0.4  0.5  -0.2 -0.1 1.3 1.2 16.2 14.8 4.5 4.1 3.6  2.8 4.3  3.6 4.0  3.1 
Communication  services -0.5  -0.3  -0.2  -0.3  -0.4  -0.3 -3.4 -2.4 -1.9  -3.1 -3.4 -2.8 1.0 0.6 0.5  0.8  0.8 0.7 
Other  services  0.2  0.1  0.4  0.3  0.2  0.2  -8.7 -6.4 -5.3  -4.5 -8.8 -6.6 6.0 4.5 8.1  6.3  6.8 5.2 
Source: Authors’ simulations with modified GTAP model (Ianchovichina, 2004). *G&Q denotes growth accompanied by improvements in export quality. 
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Table 6 Impact of China and India’s extra growth on Russia (change in prices in percent) 
   Output and exports  Imports 











































































Rice  -0.2 0.0  -2.3 -1.4 -0.7  -0.4  0.4  0.5 2.3 2.9  0.7  1.0 
Wheat  1.2  1.1 0.6  0.9  1.0  1.1 1.0 0.9  0.4  0.6  0.8  0.8 
Grains  0.9  1.0 0.3  0.8  0.8  0.9 0.7 0.7  0.1  0.3  0.5  0.6 
Vegetables  &  fruits  1.4  1.4 1.8  2.2  1.5  1.6 0.5 0.5 -0.1 0.1  0.3  0.4 
Oils  and  fats  -0.3  -0.1 -2.3  -1.5  -0.8  -0.5 -0.7 -0.5  -2.7  -2.0  -1.3  -0.9 
Sugar  -0.6  -0.4 -2.8  -2.0  -1.2  -0.8 -0.6 -0.4  -3.0  -2.5  -1.2  -0.9 
Plant-based  fibers  1.5  1.3 0.9  1.0  1.3  1.2 2.6 2.0  2.6  2.2  2.7  2.1 
Other  Crops  0.9  0.8 0.3  0.5  0.7  0.7 0.6 0.4 -0.1 -0.5  0.4  0.2 
Livestock  &  meat  -0.1  0.0 -1.9  -1.1  -0.6 -0.3  -0.4  -0.2 -2.8 -2.0  -1.0  -0.7 
Dairy  -0.2  0.0 -2.1  -1.3  -0.7 -0.3  -0.9  -0.6 -3.5 -2.6  -1.5  -1.1 
Other processed food  -0.4  -0.2  -2.5  -1.6  -1.0 -0.6  -0.9  -0.6 -3.1 -2.4  -1.5  -1.1 
Energy  6.1  4.2 1.7  0.5  5.5  3.7 5.3 3.7  1.3  0.4  4.7  3.2 
Textiles -0.9  -0.6  -4.7  -3.7 -1.8  -1.4  -1.3 -1.0  0.8  1.9  -0.9  -0.5 
Apparel  -1.1  -0.8 -5.0  -4.0  -2.0  -1.5 -2.4 -2.0  6.9  8.4  0.2  0.8 
Leather  -1.1  -0.8 -4.2  -3.2  -1.9  -1.3 -1.2 -0.8  1.9  3.1  -0.6  -0.1 
Wood  products  -0.9  -0.6 -3.2  -2.2  -1.5  -1.0 -1.4 -1.0  -4.2  -3.1  -2.1  -1.6 
Minerals  -0.9  -0.6 -3.7  -2.7  -1.6  -1.1 -1.2 -0.9  -2.2  -1.1  -1.4  -0.9 
Chemicals  0.4  0.2 -3.0  -2.3  -0.4 -0.3  -1.0  -0.8 -1.9 -1.6  -1.3  -1.0 
Metals  -0.5  -0.3 -3.5  -2.5  -1.2  -0.8 -1.6 -1.1  -1.5  -1.4  -1.7  -1.2 
Vehicles  -1.1  -0.8 -4.3  -3.2  -1.9  -1.4 -1.6 -1.2  -4.6  -3.3  -2.4  -1.7 
Machinery  &  equipment  -1.0  -0.7 -4.4  -3.3  -1.8  -1.3 -2.0 -1.5  -2.5  -1.3  -2.2  -1.6 
Electronics  -1.3  -1.0 -5.8  -4.7  -2.4  -1.9 -2.8 -2.3  -0.7  0.6  -2.4  -1.7 
Other  manufactures  -0.9  -0.6 -3.7  -2.6  -1.6  -1.1 -3.2 -2.8  3.6  5.1  -1.5  -0.8 
Trade  &  Transport  -0.4  -0.2 -3.1  -2.3  -1.0  -0.7 -1.3 -1.0  -2.9  -2.0  -1.6  -1.2 
Communication  services  -1.3  -0.9 -4.1  -2.9  -2.0  -1.4 -1.9 -1.3  -3.6  -3.0  -2.3  -1.7 
Other  services  -0.2  -0.1 -3.1  -2.3  -0.9  -0.6 -1.6 -1.2  -3.9  -2.8  -2.2  -1.6 
 Source: Authors’ simulations with modified GTAP model (Ianchovichina, 2004). *G&Q denotes growth accompanied by improvements in export quality.  29
Table 7 Impact of China and India’s extra growth on Russia (change in values in millions of USD 2004) 
   Output  Exports  Imports 
   Growth  G&Q*  G&Q (σ=7.5) Growth  G&Q  (σ =2.5)  G&Q (σ=7.5) Growth  G&Q  (σ=2.5) G&Q  (σ=7.5) 
Rice 11.9  -6.3  7.0  1.7  4.4  2.0  -2.3  2.3  -1.1 
Wheat 286.4  295.3  288.2  123.1  171.8  135.1  14.0  21.5  15.7 
Grains 91.4  44.4  78.4  8.9  11.2  9.3  4.8  5.4  5.0 
Vegetables & fruits  1,220.2  2,294.8  1,461.8  692.2  1,641.9  908.6  153.4  287.4  184.0 
Oils and fats  -12.7  -124.8  -40.0  -6.7  -32.8  -13.7  17.6  26.4  19.3 
Sugar 54.0  -41.9  30.4  1.4  -0.4  0.8  8.4  0.0  6.3 
Plant-based fibers  21.7  11.4  20.1  8.5  9.6  9.1  6.2  -13.2  1.2 
Other  Crops  41.5 24.0  36.6  17.0  31.1  20.4 28.3 27.2  28.1 
Livestock  &  meat 309.1  -445.3  134.1  93.9  248.3  131.8 99.6 148.5  113.9 
Dairy 4.3  -507.6  -119.8  -12.0  -22.3  -15.6  84.5  126.0  97.4 
Other processed food  1,441.5  2,877.3  1,778.0  1,208.8  3,289.8  1,706.3  106.1  112.9  113.6 
Energy 19,287.0  7,405.3  17,822.2  11,049.8  5,455.8  10,462.1  486.8  258.1  460.3 
Textiles -161.9  -1,200.4  -427.5  -33.3  -323.6  -112.5 -23.3 -264.6  -85.1 
Apparel -133.3  -705.9  -300.9  -29.6  -153.4  -66.1  -18.8  -444.0  -113.7 
Leather -49.1  -1,568.5  -391.3  -4.5  -145.3  -47.0  10.4  556.1  127.1 
Wood products  -13.5  5,108.0  1,077.2  337.0  5,344.1  1,434.4  83.4  315.1  139.1 
Minerals -996.7  -2,650.5  -1,425.9  89.6  188.6  113.8  -45.1  -52.8  -45.8 
Chemicals -2,479.6  -4,698.9  -3,057.5  -1,270.1 -867.4  -1,218.2  454.0 676.6  522.2 
Metals -7,050.1  -13,719.0  -8,844.5  -5,195.3 -8,652.7  -6,202.6  56.4  373.1  125.1 
Vehicles -1,245.2  -3,451.5  -1,771.6  -290.2  -146.1  -262.4  143.7  242.0  159.6 
Machinery &  -1,465.9  -4,283.5  -2,114.5  -734.8  -1,878.0  -995.6  -289.5  -1,340.5  -528.1 
Electronics -195.9  -777.8  -357.3  -61.1  -180.2  -98.3  -191.1  -1,028.4  -372.4 
Other manufactures  -975.0  -3,145.7  -1,535.0  -279.6  -663.0  -405.5  312.5  1,065.2  493.3 
Trade & Transport  -1,514.5  -5,661.9  -2,561.6  60.8  855.9  236.3  365.9  214.2  359.5 
Communication -1,354.7  -3,208.1  -1,868.0  -339.0  -423.6  -386.7  -120.2  -375.7  -186.5 
Other services  -96.7  -14,886.4  -3,467.2  -421.4  -391.3  -454.0  825.0  753.1  868.1 
Total 5,024.2  -43,023.5  -5,548.6  5,015.1  3,372.4  4,891.8  2,570.7  1,691.9  2,506.1 
Source: Authors’ simulations with the modified  GTAP model (Ianchovichina, 2004). *G&Q denotes growth accompanied by improvements in export quality.  30
Table 8 Decomposition of Russia’s welfare gains following the scenario with China and India growing by additional 2 pct points per annum 
  Gains from changes in     
  World price  Export price  Import price  Welfare change 
  Total China Total China Total China Total China 
Rice  -2.1 -1.2 -0.2 -0.1 0.5 -0.4 -1.8 -1.7 
Wheat  33.1 28.9 -17.6  -15.2 4.9  4.4  20.5 18.0 
Grains  0.7 0.6 -3.3  -2.6 3.2 2.8 0.6 0.8 
Vegetables & fruits  -66.4  -54.3  -5.3  -2.0  28.6  22.7  -43.1  -33.6 
Oils  and  fats  -5.6 -4.6 -0.6 0.0  5.2  4.0 -0.9 -0.5 
Sugar  -5.8 -5.1 -0.1 0.0 -0.2 0.0 -6.1 -5.1 
Plant-based  fibers  -16.6 -12.6  -1.0  -0.7  2.8  1.8  -14.8 -11.5 
Other  Crops  -33.4  -24.9  -0.2 0.0 4.2 3.2  -29.4  -21.7 
Livestock  &  meat  -41.7  -38.3 0.2  0.3 11.6 9.4 -30.0  -28.6 
Dairy  -5.0  -5.2 1.6 1.3 1.5 0.9 -1.9  -3.0 
Other processed food  -2.6  -2.8  21.4  18.8  9.9  8.0  28.7  24.1 
Energy  7,327.9 5,158.2  -228.1  -135.1  10.7  6.5  7,110.4 5,029.6 
Textiles  1.1 0.8 1.6 1.9 8.2 5.5  10.9  8.2 
Apparel  55.0  49.3 2.5  2.5 54.9  51.6  112.4  103.3 
Leather  4.1 0.1 0.5 0.3 -0.7 0.2 3.9 0.5 
Wood  products  -5.6 -3.4 50.9  41.9 2.4  1.0 47.7  39.5 
Minerals  -1.8 0.6 19.3 7.9 -3.9 3.5 13.6  12.0 
Chemicals  -7.2  -5.9  169.7 126.9  6.6  3.8  169.1 124.7 
Metals  -166.9 -83.8 464.1 310.1 -10.1  -7.6  287.0 218.7 
Vehicles  70.6 47.9 25.6 21.1 -2.7 -4.2 93.5 64.8 
Machinery  &  equipment  280.4 204.8  56.4  44.2  -46.7 -29.5 290.0 219.5 
Electronics  178.6  159.1  4.4 4.2 9.8 5.7  192.8  169.0 
Other  manufactures  45.9 36.3 25.8 21.4 -1.9  6.5  69.8 64.2 
Trade & Transport  23.2  12.9  117.3  91.4  -0.2  -0.2  140.3  104.1 
Communication  services  61.4 32.3 49.9 29.5 -11.9 -2.1 99.4 59.6 
Other  services  83.2 52.0 61.3 45.0  8.4  8.4 152.9  105.5 
Total  TOT  7,804.5 5,541.6  816.1  612.9  95.1  106.0  8,715.7 6,260.5 
Other welfare gains  -314.4 -234.9 
Total welfare gain  8,401.3 6,025.6 
 Source: Authors’ simulations with modified GTAP model (Ianchovichina, 2004). 
 